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INTRODUCTION
The government's role in nuclear powered generation of electricity is un-
der attack. Blamed for the reduced orders for new plants, for the increase in
the plants' cost, and most recently, for failing to insure the safety of plants,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is the focus of continuing debates
over nuclear power.' This paper assesses the hypothesis that the NRC's proce-
dures for licensing construction of nuclear power plants discourages innova-
tion and diffusion of nuclear technology. The evaluation addresses three
questions. First, are the procedures sufficiently flexible to allow or encourage
the incorporation of new technical systems and new information? Nuclear
technology is still experimental. As operating experience accumulates, and
perhaps more dramatically, experience with unforeseen accidents like Three
Mile Island, the design of reactors can be refined and improved. However,
nuclear plants are subject to rigorous licensing and review.2 If the reviews are
not flexible, they will be unable to take advantage of experience. Second, do
the preconstruction reviews unnecessarily delay construction of nuclear power
plants? As is discussed in the next Section, licensing and licensing delays are
expensive. Any increase in the cost of nuclear plants slows diffusion of the
technology and slows innovation. Delays not associated with improved plant
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thank Roger Noll, James Quirk, Leonard Weiss, and Mark Moore for suggestions, comments, and
criticism. The results in Sections III and IV are based on a summary file of AEC and NRC
Regulatory Adjudication Issuances, compiled by Margaret Bates, Brian Binger, George Fox, Da-
vid Montgomery, Darwin Niekerk, Roger Noll, James Quirk and the author, as part of a larger
project directed by Roger Noll.
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1. See, e.g., Burnham, Three Mile Island Accident: A Cloud Over Atom Power, N.Y. Times, Sept.
23, 1979, § A (News) at 1, col. 3 (Sunday ed.); Voist, Environmental and Regulatory Problems in Nu-
clear Power Plant Licensing, II NAT. RESOURCEs L. 507 (1979).
2. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 30-34, 40, 50, 51, 55. 73, 100 (1978); see generally Grainey, Nuclear Reactor
Regulation: Practice and Procedure before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, II GONz. L. REV. 809
(1976); Comment, A Survey of the Governmental Regulation of Nuclear Power Generation, 59 MARQ. L.
REv. 836 (1976).
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safety or other benefits are unnecessary. To address this question both the
costs and benefits of licensing must be considered. Finally, can current plans
for streamlining the licensing process decrease licensing time, or increase
predictability of licensing, without sacrificing flexibility or plant safety? Recent
proposals for licensing reforms have included several concepts that change
the roles of the NRC licensing boards and the public participants in
preconstruction licensing.' Brief discussions of the probable outcome of these
reforms are included in the final Section of this article.
In Section II, the impact of licensing delays and licensing procedures are
considered. The purpose is to determine first, the overall effect of licensing
on diffusion of the technology: cost increases due to licensing delays, and
other adverse consequences for diffusion of the technology. Next, the overall
process is considered, and several procedures that influence the ease with
which the NRC can approve innovations are discussed. Sections III and IV
summarize and discuss the results of a detailed study of licensing cases before
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the NRC between 1966 and
1978.' The results form a basis to address the questions listed above.
Concentrating on the impact of public participants (who are associated with
many of the major licensing delays), possible causes and results of the delays
are discussed.
The conclusions of the study are surprising. Delays in licensing are found
to be mainly due to consideration by the NRC staff of important substantive
issues. Moreover, the issues concern safety and environmental standards,
rather than any particular plant design. Furthermore, delay does not result
from public participants simply manipulating the process so as to hold up
licensing, e.g., with procedural maneuvers or legalistic strategies. Such at-
tempts are by and large unsuccessful. The study of licensing cases suggests
that licensing delays are due primarily to NRC uncertainties about reactor
safety. Consequently, recent proposals to streamline licensing may be consid-
ered a threat to safety.
II
NRC REGULATION AND INDUSTRY INNOVATION
The commercial nuclear electric generating industry in the United States
is a product of government research and development (R&D). In the two de-
3. A Congressional Budget Office study adds inflation, that is, the inflated costs of purchases
after a delay. Assuming reasonably well-working money markets-admittedly an heroic asssump-
tion-the inflated costs can be paid for through interim investment. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, DELAYS IN NUCLEAR REACTOR LICENSING AND CONSTRUCTION: THE POSSIBILITIES FOR RE-
FORM (March 1979).
4. L. Cohen. Essays on the Economics of Licensing Nuclear Power Plants (Sept. 1, 1978) (un-
published Ph.D. thesis, Cal. Inst. of Tech.).
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cades following World War II, the federal government undertook extraordi-
nary measures to develop a nuclear electric generating industry and to en-
courage the diffusion of the industry to electric utilities.5 The government de-
clared victory in 1963 when it announced a contract by General Electric and
Jersey Central Power and Light Company to build a nuclear generating unit
without government subsidy.6 The federal government subsequently withdrew
from R&D in light water reactor (LWR) technology, although its research ef-
forts in advanced nuclear technologies continued to expand.7 No federal
funds were allocated for development between 1966 and 1976.8
Nuclear power plants vendors-primarily Westinghouse and General
Electric-took over as prime developers of nuclear power in the early sixties.9
The vendors offered fixed-cost contracts ("turnkey" contracts) to utilities at
what has been estimated to be very favorable terms.'" The exact costs of the
turnkey plants have not been published, but losses to vendors have been esti-
mated at up to $1 billion."' These losses are assigned to development costs, al-
though it is unlikely that the vendors actually planned to sustain such losses in
the turnkey program.
12
With the end of the turnkey era, LWR technology supposedly became a vi-
able electric generation alternative. In 1966, utilities began ordering nuclear
plants for which they assumed the risk of cost overruns.1 3 Vendors continued
5. Current commercial reactors are known as "light water reactors" (LWR) because they em-
ploy ordinary or light water as a moderator and coolant. Only one privately owned U.S. electric
generating nuclear plant deviates from this model-the Fort St. Vrain plant-which is cooled by
gas. Unless otherwise indicated, this paper is confined to light water technology. LWR design was
developed by the U.S. Navy for use in submarines. Examples of early federal commitment to
commercialization include a statutorily limited liability for reactor operators and direct subsidies
for reactor construction. See generally 1. BuPP & J. DERIAN, LIGHT WATER: HOW THE NUCLEAR
DREAM DISSOLVED (1978). For interesting early views of the federal program, see THE AMERICAN
ASSEMBLY, ATOMS FOR POWER (1957); Adams, The Congressional Abandonment of Competition, 55
COLUM. L. REV. 158 (1955).
6. The government declared victory in 1963 with the announcement by General Electric and
Jersey Central Power & Light Company of a contract to build a nuclear generating unit without
government subsidy. Jersey Utility Plans Nuclear Power Unit Costing $68 Million, N.Y. Times, Dec.
12, 1963, at 59. col. 2. See also Why Atomic Power Dims Today, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 17, 1975, at 98.
7. I. BuPP & J. DERIAN, supra note 5, at 50-52.
8. Since 1976 the Energy Research and Development Administration (later the Dept. of En-
ergy) has had a small program for improving light water reactors. Funded at $42.1 million in
1976 and $48.9 million in 1977, the program is in part a response to changed political goals re-
garding breeder reactors. Its main thrust is toward improving the efficiency of LWRs With re-
spect to uranium use. (Budget figures from W. SHAPLEY, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE
FEDERAL BUDGET: FY 1977, at 73 (1976) and W. SHAPLEY, D. PHILLIPS & H. ROBACK, RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET: FY 1978, at 51 (1977)).
9. 1. BUPP & J. DERIAN, supra note 5, at 5, 8.
10. Id. at 48-49, 72.
11. W. Montgomery & J. Quirk, Cost Escalation in Nuclear Power (Environmental Quality
Laboratory Memo. No. 21, Cal. Inst. of Tech., Jan. 1978) at 14-15.
12. H. Burness, W. Montgomery & J. Quirk, The Turnkey Era in Nuclear Power (Cal. Inst.
of Tech. Social Science Working Paper No. 175, Sept. 1977).
13. Id.
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to offer long-term fuel contracts and the government continued to provide
utilities with indemnification from public liability and with spent fuel buy back
arrangements.' 4 Since the mid-sixties, the primary government role in LWR
technology has been regulatory: activities designed to ensure the safety of nu-
clear power plants and (ironically) public acceptance of the technology. 5 Cur-
rently, the NRC limits its R&D activities to confirmatory research; that is, re-
search designed to confirm the safety specification of reactor components.'1
The program is budgeted at $95 million for 1979.'1
As in other heavily regulated industries, claims are made that government
intervention is detrimental to continued expansion of the industry,"8 and that
current regulation decreases the rate of innovation in the industry. Expected
and unexpected licensing delays influence innovation for several reasons. Dif-
fusion of a new technology is considered to be an aspect of innovation.' 9
Thus, the extent to which utilities avoid investment in nuclear power because
of NRC licensing reduces the rate of LWR innovation. Second, invention re-
sponds to market demand. Numerous studies have shown that about three-
fourths of all inventions are "demand pull" as opposed to "technology-
push."2  R&D expenditures are higher where greater returns can be
expected: for instance, in industries that have a high growth potential. Slow
diffusion and the expectation of continued barriers to the diffusion of LWR
technology decrease private investment in LWR R&D. This effect is enhanced
if longer licensing time is expected for the first nuclear plants that feature a
design innovation.
The NRC's construction permit (CP) licensing process bears on this
14. It was generally assumed that the government would develop end-of-fuel-cycle
technologies including reprocessing, breeder reactors, waste disposal and plant decommissioning.
Long-term fuel contracts are no longer available. See Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium
Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119 (1977).
15. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (principally
codified, with amendments, at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976)) formally separated the Atomic En-
ergy Commission into two parts: the regulatory functions went to the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission while research and development went to the Energy Research and Development Admin-
istration. The time period covered by this paper encompasses both the AEC and the NRC. Both
agencies are referred to herein as "NRC" or "the Commission."
16. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5845(b), 5845(f) (1976 & Supp. 1 1977); Palfrey, Energy and the Environ-
ment: The Special Case of Nuclear Power, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1403-07 (1974).
17. Personal conversation with Mr. Raymond Sanetrik, Director of the Budget, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, July 31, 1979.
The AEC's light water reactor research program after 1966 was likewise a confirmatory re-
search program. A description and critique (in addition to a description of the technology) is con-
tained in Study Group on Light-Water Reactor Safety, American Physical Society, Report, 47 REV.
MOD. PHYSICS, SUPP. 1, at 1 (1975).
18. E.g., Voist, supra note 1, at 507.
19. "Economists define an innovation as the first commercial application of a new or im-
proved process or product." E. MANSFIELD, J. RAPOPORT, A. ROMEO, E. VILLANI, S. WAGNER & F.
Husic, TIHE PRODUCTION AND APPLICATION OF NEw INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY 12 (1977).
20. Id.
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discussion in several ways. Licensing is expensive. Until the utility has a CP,
work cannot proceed on the reactor.2 ' Delays or extensions of licensing are
associated with costs: carrying charges on capital already expended, substitute
energy costs if the plant is not completed on schedule, costs of labor and de-
livery contracts that are arranged prior to CP issuance, and the costs (or sav-
ings) associated with changes in regulations and productivity at the time of CP
issuance .
2
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the real cost of a
month's delay in obtaining a CP at $3.6 million (about one-third of one per-
cent of the total construction costs). 23 This figure takes into account only the
interest and replacement charges. Other studies that have attempted a more
complete analysis estimate the cost of a month's delay at over two-thirds of
one percent. 24 While the cost estimates of these plants are notoriously bad,
extentions of licensing time (particularly unexpected extensions) carry a sig-
nificant charge.
25
As Table I indicates, the average length of time for a utility to obtain a CP
(the elapsed time between applying for and receiving a permit) rose from 13
months in 1966 to a high of 37.7 months in 1970. Since 1970 the licensing
time has decreased somewhat. In addition, licensing time varies within years.
Utilities are confronted with potential licensing delays and the resulting addi-
tional costs. To the extent that licensing increases the cost of nuclear plants,
investment in them and the rate of diffusion of the technology will decrease.
A second effect of long licensing times is that it increases the time between
conceiving a plan to build a nuclear power plant and the production of elec-
trical generation. Lead times for nuclear units are estimated at ten to twelve
years. 26 The problem with long lead times is the difficulty that utilities have in
estimating accurate future capacity requirements. Since the 1973 Arab oil em-
bargo, demand for electricity has failed to conform to the load forecasting
models of utilities. 27 Accurately estimating demand twelve years in the future
has become virtually impossible.2 8 The implication to nuclear power is that in-
21. The exact nature of construction allowed prior to CP issuance changed several times dur-
ing this period. See p. 74, infra.
22. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 3.
23. Id. at 14.
24. L. Cohen, supra note 4, at 44. Contra, W. Mooz. COST ANALYSIS OF LIGH-\ WATER REACTOR
POWER PLANTS 41 (Rand Corp. Rep. No. R-2304-DOE, June 1978) (["C]onstruction permit time is
probably not a significant determinant of plant costs.").
25. E.g., W. Montgomery & J. Quirk, supra note 1I, at 43-52.
26. E.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 3, at 19.
27. For a brief description of changes in electricity sales patterns since the 1973 oil embargo
see Office of Utilities Programs, Federal Energy Administration. A Study of the Electric Utility In-
dustry Demand, Costs, and Rates, Tab I at II II to 11- 12, Tab II at 11-25 to 11-26 (Conservation
Paper No. 53, July 1976).
28. For a sample of assumptions which must be considered before estimates of demand can
be made, see, id., Tab II at IV-1 to IV-3.
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TABLE I
ELAPSED TIME BETWEEN CONSTRUCTION PERMIT APPLICATION AND
CONSTRUCTION PERMIT ISSUANCE
Year of Number of Standard
Application Applications Average* Deviation*
1966 16 13 4.7
1967 25 13.04 4.7
1968 12 23 11.9
1969 11 28.4 11.1
1970 17 37.7 10.3
1971 12 34.5 21.6
1972 6 24.2 5.7
1973 24 26.8 11.1
1974 40
1975 9
1976 4
1977 1
* The average and standard deviation calculations are based on a sample of units ordered.
This procedure corrects for multiple unit applications. The sample is described in Section III.
It is still impossible to calculate an average or standard deviation for plants licensed since 1974.
SOURCE: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (1978).
vestment in nuclear generating units becomes less attractive the longer the
lead times for the units are because such investment requires that the utility
rely on a demand forecast that is probably inaccurate. To the extent that
NRC licensing contributes to longer lead times, it decreases nuclear invest-
ment.
A third difficulty with the licensing period relates to construction
financing. Uncertain licensing times contribute to uncertain costs and pay-
ment schedules. This situation requires flexibility in the operation of the util-
ity, including its financing arrangements. Utilities have had increased trouble
arranging financing, particularly for nuclear power plants.2 9 The publicized
referenda over allowing construction work in progress in the rate base, a pro-
cedure that would allow the utility to finance construction from current sales
to customers, attest to financing difficulties. The CBO cites financing as the
major cause of 20 percent of construction delays at nuclear power plants." If
uncertain and long licensing periods contribute to financing difficulties, the
utilities will be less likely to invest in nuclear units.
An applicant for a nuclear power plant CP and operating license (OL)
goes through a complex licensing process. Figure 1 summarizes schematically
the current NRC process.
31
29. See, e.g., Office of Finance and Incentives, Federal Energy Administration, Electricity
Rates and the Energy Crisis 3, at 61-64 (August 1974).
30. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 3, at 23.
31. See, e.g., Grainey, supra note 2.
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Figure I. The NRC Licensing Process.
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Once the applicant files a CP application, four separate reviews are set in
motion: (1) an antitrust review, (2) an environmental review by the NRC staff,
and (3, 4) two safety reviews, one by the NRC staff, and the other by the Ad-
visory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). Upon completion of the
staff reviews, the Commission issues hearing notices. Environmental review
leads to a limited work authorization (LWA), permitting site preparation and
construction of equipment that is independent of the reactor. The safety pro-
ceeding typically lasts longer and leads to CP issuance.
The environmental review is conducted to determine if the proposed plant
is in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). a2 Com-
pliance involves an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), an environmental
cost-benefit analysis, a "Need for Power" analysis, proof that applicable envi-
ronmental laws regarding thermal and atmospheric pollution are satisfied,
and an overall finding that the proposed facility will not cause undue environ-
mental harm." Detailed 34 environmental3 5 reviews were instituted after the
1971 Calvert Cliffs decision.3 6
Throughout the commercial period of nuclear power, the government
banned all construction work on the reactor portion of the plant until CP is-
suance. Before the Calvert Cliffs decision clarified the NEPA requirements for
the AEC, site preparation and certain construction activities could proceed
prior to CP issuance. The Commission, however, continued to allow preCP
construction in some cases and construction on plants with CPs that had not
yet had complete environmental reviews. 37 As a result of the Calvert Cliffs de-
cision, the AEC had to conduct environmental reviews for all plants that were
either operating, under construction, or in licensing. A tremendous backlog
of work ensued . 3 The Commission finally settled the preCP construction is-
sue in 1974, issuing regulations that specified the preparatory work ("Limited
Work") that could commence after successful completion of a site suitability
and NEPA review. 3 9 Thus, except for a brief period in 1973, preCP construc-
tion was allowed at plants. However, for several years in the early seventies
the practice elicited controversy and the utilities were subject to the threat
(and sometimes reality) of unannounced construction halts.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
33. 10 C.F.R. § 51.20(a) (1978).
34. Id. at § 51.20(b).
35. Id. at § 51.20(c).
36. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). For a detailed review of the Calvert Cliffs decision, see JOINT COMM.
ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., SELECTED MATERIALS ON THE CALVERT CLIFFS DECISION,
ITS ORIGIN AND AFTERMATH (Comm. Print 1972).
37. E.g., Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station). 4 A.E.C. 907, 907-10 (1972).
38. In 1972, in response to the apparent backlog and fears of power shortages, Congress al-
lowed the AEC for about a year to issue temporary operating licenses without a NEPA review.
Act ofJune 2. 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-307, 86 Stat. 191.
39. 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(e) (1978).
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As a result of court decisions and major Commission actions, environmen-
tal reviews have become increasingly complex. For instance, since 1974, the
review incorporates a consideration of the impact of energy conservation
measures on the need for power from the proposed nuclear unit.40 The
safety reviews have addressed a consistent set of issues.4" Findings are made
on the adequacy of plant location in terms of surrounding population and ex-
pected radioactive releases, on the extent of normal radioactive releases on
the consequences of the maximum credible accident, and on the integrity of
the plant under other accident conditions. 42 Additionally, the Licensing Board
evaluates the applicant's construction quality-assurance program and radio-
logical monitoring programs, 43 and must find the plant not inimical to the
common defense, security or safety of the public. 4
4
The public part of safety reviews centers around a checklist of regulations.
The regulations may not (except in very unusual circumstances) be challenged
in a licensing case. 45 Instead, regulations are treated in rulemaking cases, and
then applied to all future (and sometimes already completed) licensing cases.
The most celebrated rulemaking cases of the early 1970s involved emergency
core cooling systems 46 and the "as-low-as-practicable" radiation release
standards. 47
As is discussed below, the NRC is not required to make a final determina-
tion on all safety issues at the CP hearing. Upon completion of plant design
the applicant applies for an operating license. The staff reviews the plant to
assess previously unsettled issues and compliance with the conditions and
promises in the CP. The termination of operating license cases is timed to co-
incide with actual completion of construction. 48 Public hearings in operating
license cases have not been mandatory since 1962. 4 1 Prior to 1974, many
40. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point, Unit 2), 7 A.E.C. 758 (1974).
41. The review of safety issues has, however, become far more complex as the staff has
gained experience with operational reactors. As one staff member put it, "We know more about
what can go wrong, so we have more things to look at." (Personal conversation with the author.)
42. 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.105, 100.10, 100.1 1(a) at n.l (1978).
43. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.34(a)(7), 50.34(b)(3) (1978). Monitoring for radiation exposure to indi-
viduals at the reactor site is detailed in 10 C.F.R. § 20.202 (1978).
44. 10 C.F.R. § 50.40(c) (1978).
45. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant), 4 A.E.C. 243, 244
(1969).
46. Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light- Water-Cooled Nuclear
Power Reactors, Docket No. RM 50-1. For a discussion of the case, written while it was underway,
see S. EBBIN & R. KASPER, CITIZEN GROUPS AND THE NUCLEAR POWER CONTROVERSY 125-39 (1974).
47. Effluents from Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors, Docket No. RM 50-2. The
standard has been interpreted to preclude the NRCs establishment of a fixed numerical specifica-
tion. York Comm. for a Safe Environ. v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 527 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
48. E. ROLPH, REGULATION OF NUCLEAR POWER: THE CASE OF THE LIGHT WATER REACTOR 65
(Rand Corp. Rep. No. R-2104-NSF, 1977).
49. Act of Aug. 29, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-615, §§ 2, 189a, 76 Stat. 409, 42 U.S.C. § 2239
(1976).
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operating license cases incorporated environmental reviews for those plants
that did not receive full NEPA review during CP hearings."
The long, complex licensing period is considered necessary because of the
experimental nature of the industry. A rationale for the multiple reviews is
uncertainty over technology-that some feature of the plant which is danger-
ous may be overlooked at one of the review stages. For instance, the Appeal
Board Chairman in the Gulf States case characterized intervention as follows:
Public participation in licensing proceedings not only 'can provide valuable as-
sistance to the adjudicatory process', [footnote omitted] but on frequent occa-
sions demonstrably has done so . . . many of the substantial safety and envi-
ronmental issues which have received the scrutiny of licensing boards and
appeal boards were raised in the first instance by an intervenor."
Another rationale for multiple reviews is that nuclear technology is changing
rapidly. Improvements and innovations can be accommodated within the cur-
rent licensing process and no special procedures are necessary. This is partic-
ularly evident in NRC rules allowing uncertainties in plant performance at
the time of CP issuance. According to the Commission rule, a CP can be
granted even if all safety issues have not been resolved; the design details of
nuclear power plants are in fact usually unfinished when the CP is issued.5 2
The NRC reviews the plant design during construction and prior to issuing
an operating license. Completed reactors are tested for about a year before
they are run at capacity.5 ' The "unresolved safety issues" issue was, for a
while, a rallying contention of intervenors.5 4 The issue actually was tested
much earlier in court, and the NRC was found to have authority for not
resolving all issues prior to CP issuance. 55 Like multiple review stages, the
procedure should enable innovations to be made during the course of con-
struction without major dislocations. However, it ensures the necessity of a
public operating license hearing, from which further unanticipated delays can
result.
Despite the expense of delays and design changes, the NRC has the au-
thority to order retrofitting, particularly if the innovation significantly affects
safety.3 6 Only two major retrofits have been ordered by the NRC as of 1978:
50. E.g., Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units I and 2).
7 A.E.C. 487-91 (1974).
51. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units I and 2), 7 A.E.C. 222, 226-27 (1974).
52. 10 C.F.R. § 50.35 (1978); see also 10 C.F.R. § 2.104(b)(1)(i) (1978).
53. Average of times for plants issued an operating license after 1970 as reported in UNITED
STATES DEP'T OF ENERGY, U.S. CENTRAL NUCLEAR ELECTRIC GENERATING UNITS: SIGNIFICANT
MILESTONES (DOE/ET-0030/4, 1978).
54. See, e.g., Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-I), 7 A.E.C.
557. 564 (1974); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), 6 A.E.C. 271, 280
(1973).
55. Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. Int'l Union of Electrical Workers, 367 U.S. 396 (1961).
56. 10 C.F.R. § 50.109 (1978).
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emergency core cooling systems (ECCS), following hearings in which such sys-
tems were argued for by both outside and inside critics of older plants; 57 and,
after the Brown's Ferry fire, new fire systems.5" Major retrofits are expected
to ensue due to the accident at Three Mile Island. The fire system retrofit
cost only about $1 million per plant.5 9 However, the ECCS retrofit is a major
investment. Consolidated Edison shut down its Indian Point 1 plant, which
had operated for some years, rather than install a costly ECCS system.
60
Some plants were modified following the passage of NEPA. 61 In most
cases, responsibility for ordering the modifications did not rest with the AEC.
However, in the Brunswick case, the AEC (responding to the EPA) ordered
construction of cooling towers, a change requiring the redesign and re-
building of numerous parts of the plant.62 Retrofits are rare events. They
tend to be dramatic and command attention in industry and government folk-
lore. Far more common are NRC-ordered changes at the design stage; as of
1978, no CP applications had gone through the NRC review without NRC-
required design amendmeents.
Design changes and retrofits reflect one or more of the following points.
First, experience with plants uncovered a weakness (e.g., the fire standards).
Second, social values had changed, as reflected in the NEPA. Third, a system
previously thought to be acceptable became unacceptable because of evidence
unrelated to operating experience: simulation studies, theoretical work, or
(conceivably) new inventions.6" The motives that lie behind retrofitting indi-
cate that its impact on innovation is ambiguous. A new product might define
a new market or standard of safety and be required on past and future
plants. This potential is an incentive for work on R&D projects that offer sig-
nificant safety improvements,6 4 and increase potential profits to small suppli-
ers.65 However, the threat of retrofits may decrease the incentive to invest in
R&D by the entities that have the greatest opportunity to test for important
57. See S. EBBIN & R. KASPER, supra note 46, at 127-30.
58. Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, 7 N.R.C. 400, 424 (1978). See also [19781
NRC ANN. RrP. 43-44.
59. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 3, at 12.
60. Id.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
62. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Brtnswick Steam Electric Plant, Units I and 2), 8 A.E.C.
1144, 1155-60. 1170 app. A (1974).
63. W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCErABLE RISK 6, 9 (1976).
64. See generally, Capron & Noll, Summary and Conclusion, in TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN REG-
ULATED INDUSTRIES 197-226 (W. Capron ed. 1971).
65. The discussion suggests that competition may be an aid to innovation. It is noteworthy
that competition in this field is largely a by-product of the Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No.
85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957), which limits operators' liability for damage from reactor accidents.
Critics of nuclear power assert that the Act promotes not competition, but the introduction of a
hazardous technology before risks are full' understood. E.g.. Green, Nuclear Power: Risk, Liability,
and Indemnity, 71 MICH. L. REV. 479, 506 (1973).
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innovations-the utilities, the large vendors (if committed to standardized
designs"6 ), and the Commission itself.
These general characteristics of the licensing process demonstrate that the
NRC allows for innovation and change.67 Flexibility in licensing, however,
comes at a considerable cost in terms of delays and uncertainty. Consequent-
ly, the procedures contribute to a decrease in innovation because of overall
decline in nuclear investment due to cost increases, industry standardization
to obviate the need for complex licensing, and intra-utility standardization to
realize scale economies in licensing. All three outcomes are observed (though
not entirely nor even predominantly because of these procedures). Decline in
investment is shown in Table I. Standardization of plant design is one of the
key features of the 1978 reform proposals, discussed in the last Section of this
paper. Intra-utility standardization is seen in the utilities' practice of filing for
multiple unit plants and obtaining construction permits for all the units while
scheduling their completion far off in the future. For instance, Arizona Power
and Light obtained CPs for Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 in May 1976, although the
units were originally intended to start commercial operation in 1982, 1984,
and 1986, respectively. 68 Similarly, the Shearon Harris Plant Units 1, 2, 3, and
4 of Carolina Power & Light obtained CPs in a 1978 joint hearing, but were
scheduled to begin operation in two-year intervals between 1984 and 1990.69
Licensing multiple units in one process does not take appreciably longer than
licensing a single unit. After the initial expense of designing an acceptable
power plant, utilities are unlikely to promote major design changes, even
though the units may not be completed.
Thus, NRC procedures designed to accommodate design changes are ap-
parently unsuccessful. The lengthy and uncertain licensing time detracts from
licensing flexibility so as to discourage new plant proposals and to encourage
intra-utility standardization. On one hand, the AEC was initially set up so that
an evolving industry could be licensed, but its licensing structure imposes
costs on a marginally competitive industry and sets up incentives against a
rapid rate of R&D.
66. See pp. 86, 95-96, infra.
67. Somewhat standardized designs probably go through the licensing process with more ease
than unusual ones. Unfamiliar with the novel designs, the NRC staff will take longer to review
these applications. Lack of experience with a new type of reactor may cause concern at the public
hearing. Thus, innovation, through delay, imposes a cost on the first utilities to propose it.
Only one reactor has been built that is exceptionally different, the Fort St. Vrain, a gas cooled
reactor, described above. The Public Service Co. of Colorado applied for a CP in 1966 and
obtained it 23 months later (compared to the 1966 average of 13 months). See U.S. DEP'T OF
ENERGY, U.S. CENTRAL NUCLEAR ELECTRIC GENERATING UNITS: SIGNIFICANT MILESTONES 2
(DOE/ET1-0030/4, 1978) (contains status of nuclear plants as of April 1, 1978).
68. Id. at 15.
69. Id. at 10.
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III
DELAYS IN CONSTRUCTION PERMIT LICENSING
1966-PRESENT
Critics of the NRC licensing process claim that public participation causes
undue delays in licensing, both extending the licensing process and con-
tributing to the variability or uncertainty in licensing time. 70 Proponents of
nuclear power assert that the NRC has established unnecessarily restrictive en-
vironmental and safety standards in response to uninformed public criti-
cism.7" The CP hearings are an important forum for public participation and
an examination of them yields information on the validity of this claim.
Public participation in NRC licensing is mandated through the institution
of intervention. 72 According to the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, interested par-
ties can participate in cases involving licenses to construct and operate nuclear
power plants by applying for intervention status. 73 The outcome of these
cases are described in the decisions of the Atomic Safety and Licensing
Boards, the Appeals Boards, and the Commissions. The decisions, published
in the Regulatory Adjudication Issuances, form the data base core for this
study. In order to examine systematically the outcome of licensing cases, a
sample of 116 nuclear units was chosen. The sample includes applications for
CPs between 1966 and 1974, omitting multiple units at a single site where the
second, third, and/or fourth unit had an identical history to the first. In some
of the Tables below, the 1974 applications are excluded because CP licensing
history for many of these applications is incomplete. Table II shows the num-
ber of license applications and issuances for units in this sample.
Commission rules allow any interested individual who files the appropriate
papers to have intervention status.74 However, it is practically impossible to
participate (as opposed to observe the proceeding) without expert witnesses
and legal representation. The popular concept of intervenors is a well-
organized, well-funded private group that intervenes with legal representation
and becomes a full party to the case-e.g., the Calvert Cliffs Coordinating
Committee, the Sierra Club, or the New England Coalition on Nuclear Poilu-
70. E.g., D. BURN, NUCLEAR POWER AND THE ENERGY CRISIS 46-47 (1978).
71. See, e.g., id. at 47-48; Gulf States Util. Co. (River Bend Station, Units I and 2), 7 A.E.C.
222 (1974). On the role of Congress in the licensing process, see B. Weingast, Congress, Regula-
tion and the Decline of Nuclear Power (Center for the Study of American Business Working Pa-
per No. 29, Washington U., St. Louis, Mo., April 1978).
72. l0 C.F.R. § 2.714 (1978).
73. The public also participates in individual licensing cases through state proceedings, ACRS
review, and in general licensing through NRC rulemaking hearings and Congress. See generally
Nelkin & Fallows, The Evolution of the Nuclear Debate: The Role of Public Participation, 3 ANN. REV.
ENERGY 275 (1978).
74. 10 C.F.R. § 2.714a (1978).
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TABLE II
LIcENSE ISSUANCES IN THE SAMPLE OF LICENSING CASES
[Vol. 43: No. 1
CP applications CP issuances OL issuances
1966 8 0 0
1967 22 7 0
1968 11 20 0
1969 11 8 0
1970 15 8 0
1971 6 4 1
1972 5 9 6
1973 19 11 11
1974 18 17 12
1975 0 5 3
1976 0 3 2
Total 116 92 35
tion. However, many intervenors are individuals living near the plant who re-
strict their intervention to observation and limited participation at hearings.
The expensive nature of intervention resulted in many requests for financial
assistance from intervenors in 1974. In the Vermont Yankee case, intervenors
requested twenty-five thousand dollars so they could "minimally" participate
in a subsidiary aspect of an OL case.1 5 Full intervention in a CP case is esti-
mated to cost hundreds of thousands of dollars .76
The fate of intervenors lacking legal counsel was demonstrated dramatic-
ally in a 1974 case involving the Carolina Environmental Study Group and
Duke Power Company.7 7 The intervenors-who later became highly sophis-
ticated-stipulated for an expedited hearing, at which they were allowed
to present in written form, at one time, material they would have introduced
during the course of a normal hearing. Apparently unaware of the legal con-
cept of official notice, they requested that the Licensing Board take notice of
certain technical journal articles. As the articles did not consist of generally ac-
cepted fact, under the rules concerning the taking of official notice the Board
refused the request. As a result, the intervenors could not78 present any of
the information on the impact of radiation which they had collected. The
Licensing Board attributed their quandary to lack of proper legal advice and
noted in the initial decision that the Board had warned the intervenors
75. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), 7
A.E.C. 982 (1974).
76. S. EBBIN & R. KASPER, supra note 46, at 194.
77. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units I and 2), 7 A.E.C. 659 (1974).
78. 10 C.F.R. § 2.743(i) (1978).
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against undertaking a complex administrative procedure without proper
counsel. 7
9
In addition to private individuals, representatives of the states in which the
plants are located frequently intervene. Some states participate vigorously,
particularly in the environmental phases of the review. The earliest requests
for considering thermal pollution came from state intervenors. Other states in
the sample were merely onlookers, intervening in an observer status. 80
Usually the opposing private intervenors consolidate and present one case.
If public intervenors are opposing the license, private intervenors frequently
support them and vice versa. In the 92 CP cases resolved prior to 1977, 18
percent were uncontested, and 33 percent had "major," or well-funded
intervenors."' Historically, intervenor action has varied: all of the cases re-
solved in 1971 had major intervenors, as opposed to about 50 percent in
1973.82 Table III provides more information about the distribution of con-
tested and uncontested cases."3
Intervenors file a petition with a list of issues." The Licensing Board rules
on the petitions in prehearing conferences. A major reason for the confer-
ences is to weed out and winnow down the list of objections, and (less success-
fully) to mediate compromises between parties. In an extreme case involving
Duke Power Company's William McGuire plant, the Carolina Environmental
Study Group filed a petition listing 223 issues. The Licensing Board allowed
about a dozen of these issues to be raised in the hearing.8 5 The criterion for
admitting issues is that they can be resolved in an individual licensing case;
they must directly relate to the proposed plant and to the Licensing Board de-
cisions on environmental degradation or safety. The NRC is very careful to
hear any issue that might develop into a valid one. Direct attacks on Commis-
sion regulations are considered "generic" and cannot be an issue in licensing
79. Duke Power Co., supra note 78, at 666.
80. A fourth type of intervenor are wholesale customers of the applicant. Prior to 1970 they
intervened requesting antitrust reviews. Following a 1970 change in the Atomic Energy Act that
made review mandatory, Act of Dec. 19. 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-560, § 6, 84 Stat. 1472 (amending
42 U.S.C. § 2135(c) (1964)), the intervenors used the AEC review to sue the applicant for anti-
trust violations. Antitrust reviews are separate from the other parts of the CP review. They have
influenced the timing of construction in only one case since 1970, and then for only a few
months. See generally L. Cohen, supra note 4, ch. 3.
81. L. Cohen, supra note 4, at 14.
82. Id.
83. A curious lineup occurred in 1974 decisions regarding the Vermont Nuclear Power Plant.
The AEC staff and the Advisory Comm. on Reactor Safeguards argued that the containment at-
mosphere should be "inerted," or filled with nitrogen to avoid buildup of an explosive mixture of
hydrogen and oxygen during an accident. The applicant and intervenors opposed the recommen-
dation. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), 7
A.E.C. 431 (1974).
84. 10 C.F.R. § 2.714(a) (1978).
85. Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units I and 2), 6 A.E.C. 92, 93-94
(1973).
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unless the intervenor presents evidence of immediate danger.8 6 However,
site-specific compliance with any regulation is a legitimate issue. Frequently is-
sues are admitted on this basis, but- when the intervenor attempts to address
the regulation directly, the issue is rejected.
The case of radioactive release standards illustrates these concepts. NRC
regulations state that, with certain qualifications,
(a) There may be included in any application for a license . . . proposed limits
upon levels of radiation . . . resulting from the applicant's possession or use of
radioactive material .... The Commission will approve the proposed limits if
the applicant demonstrates that . . . [they] are not likely to cause any individ-
ual to receive a dose to the whole body in any period of one calendar year in
excess of 0.5 rem .... 87
In addition,
(c) [licenses] should make every reasonable effort to maintain . . . releases ...
as low as is reasonably achievable. . . . taking into account the state of the
technology, and the economics of improvements in relation to benefits to the
public health and safety, and other societal and socioeconomic considerations,
and in relation to the utilization of atomic energy in the public interest.88
The 0.5 rem level of section 20.105 was established in a generic proceed-
ing.8 9 On the other hand, an "as low as is reasonably achievable" challenge
(which can address the same 0.5 standard) will be heard in licensing. As this
rather simplified example shows, it is not always obvious in practice whether
an issue is generic or site-specific, even according to the Commission rules.
The Commission has the discretion to label an issue as "licensing" or "ge-
neric" when controversy persists.90
The distinction between generic and licensing issues is even fuzzier in the
environmental area. The Environmental Defense Fund argued at the Nine
Mile Point 2 hearing that the National Environmental Policy Act required the
AEC to consider whether there would be a "need for power" from the pro-
posed plant, and whether energy conservation measures might reduce-and
counteract-that need."i The AEC considered the issue, but after hearing evi-
dence, the Licensing Board ruled that energy conservation was not a legiti-
mate issue. The AEC reversed this decision under threat of a probable court
reversal opening the hearing to considerations of demand projections for the
Niagara Mohawk service areas and viable alternatives to both the nuclear
86. E.g., Allied-General Nuclear Services (Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant), 7 A.E.C. 1015,
1019-20 (1974).
87. 10 C.F.R. § 20.105(a) (1978).
88. Id. at § 20.1(c).
89. Effluents from Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Rectors, supra note 47.
90. Morningside Renewal Council, Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 482 F.2d 234, 239
(2d. Cir. 1973).
91. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point, Unit 2), 7 A.E.C. 1046, 1060-67 (1974).
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plant and increased electrical usage.9 2 The Licensing Board's final decision
rested on the "substitution theory"-that even if projected demand failed to
materialize, Niagara Mohawk would benefit from the nuclear plant by closing
down older, less efficient plants. 93 Ironically, shortly after this decision,
Niagara Mohawk announced a one year delay in the plant's construction
schedule because of an unanticipated reduction in electricity demand.
The issues raised during this period fall into six general categories, none
of which are confined to a single year or subgroup of years. Table III shows
the distribution of these issues by year of CP application.
The first two issues correspond to environmental reviews. Environment-
EIS; NEPA includes issues relating to the form of the environmental review
and the requirements of NEPA. Environment-Cooling; Technical comprises
substantive environmental issues, e.g., the appropriateness of the plant cooling
system in view of thermal pollution. While the first issue only has delay poten-
tial so far as licensing goes, theoretically the second could result in a different
plant design.
The intervenors in the Bailly CP case94 argued that the cost-benefit analysis
performed for the plant was inadequate. Costs stemming from the entire nu-
clear fuel cycle should be included; alternatives to the Bailly site were treated
inadequately in the cost-benefit study and the need for power analysis was inac-
curate.9 5 These issues are not just procedural. The site consideration consti-
tutes a use of the cost-benefit analysis by the intervenors as a vehicle to argue
against the Bailly site itself. But the issues immediately address the form of
the Commission review rather than the plant itself. Alternately, the inter-
venors presented evidence that the construction plans would change the
groundwater level and permanently damage the neighboring Dunes National
Lakeshore Park. They further asserted that the proposed water towers would
be ugly and detrimental to the local environment. 96
Safety issues fall into three categories: normal operations, plant accidents,
and quality assurance. The first relates to normal operations. The most com-
mon issue raised under this heading concerns the level of radiation released
during normal operation of the plant-whether they are "as low as practica-
ble" or "as low as is reasonably achievable." Another issue concerns plants
near commercial fishing grounds-whether liquid radioactive releases might
contaminate shellfish beds.97 A third topic involves technical aspects of the
92. Id. at 1079.
93. Id. at 1083-84, 1086.
94. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-l), 7 A.E.C. 557 (1974),
aff'd, 8 A.E.C. 244 (1974).
95. 7 A.E.C., at 615-25.
96. Id. at 589-91, 599-601.
97. E.g.. Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), 5 A.E.C. 103, 111-12 (1972).
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plants such as pipes, welds, or bolts. The last topic overlaps with the safety di-
vision used here.98
The second category involves issues relating to plant accidents-the effec-
tiveness of the emergency core cooling system. The category includes issues
relating to major accidents such as the very low-probability, high-risk event.
One frequent issue in licensing cases in this category is the definition of the
Low Population Zone (LPZ).9 ' The NRC calculates probable doses from
various accidents as a function of distance from the reactor, meteorology and
plant design. The LPZ is a restricted area intended, as its name implies, to in-
clude few residents. LPZ arguments concern both dose calculations and popu-
lation projections.
The third safety category includes the quality assurance program, evacua-
tion plans, and security plans. The category includes safety-related issues that
are not matters of technical plant design.
The final category of issue is characterized as "Process." This includes
complaints about how the CP proceeding is held and about the individuals
involved. Process includes issues frequently associated with intervenors by
proponents of nuclear power-legal maneuvers intended to delay the hearing,
claims that the Licensing Board is biased, arguments over subpoenas, argu-
ments over hearsay evidence and documentation. As shown in Table III, most
cases with active intervenors involved one or more process issues.
The resolution of these issues in licensing cases reveals a remarkable pat-
tern. To simplify the analysis, resolutions were categorized into nine possibili-
ties. As is necessarily the case with simplifications, details of the resolutions
are lost in translation, and judgment used (sometimes too liberally) in fitting
resolutions into the categories. In each case, the final resolution of the issue
was graded. Thus, the energy conservation issue in Niagara Mohawk, de-
scribed above, shows up in Table IV as a major Environment EIS victory (the
basic issue being whether or not to consider the issue in a cost-benefit analy-
sis), despite the fact that the Board ruled that the applicant could go ahead
with the plant. The Bailly groundwater case, described above, is classified as
denied in the "Consider and Reject" category. This was the ultimate resolu-
tion of the issue although it went through numerous hearings and, on several
occasions, the Board halted construction at the plant pending yet another
hearing. The "not issue" resolution category includes numerous cases where
the Licensing Board considered an issue, but upon hearing the intervenor's
case, decided that the issue was generic and invalid for consideration in
licensing.
Table IV reveals that the AEC ruled against the intervenors-resolutions
98. See L. Cohen, supra note 4, app. A.
99. See 10 C.F.R. § 100.3(b).
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TABLE IV*
Environ: Environ: Safety: Safety: Planning,
EIS Technical Normal Accidents QA, Security Process
1. Rejected 12 3 14 - - 16
2. Consider & reject 5 1 2 - - 1
3. Not Issue 6 3 1 18 14 3
4. Consider at OL - 1 - - - 1
5. Resolve in dif-
ferent forum - 6 3 - --
6. Granted-minor 2 1 - - - 3
7. Monitor or Test - 3 4 - --
8. Granted-major 2 2 - - - 1
9. Mixed (process) - - 16
10. Unknown - 2 - - -
Subtotal 1-5 21 14 20 18 14 21
Total 25 22 24 18 14 40
* See Table III for complete issue headings
one through five-in the majority of cases. Where the intervenor's case was
accepted, the outcome was typically to order more tests, to monitor, or
various minor changes. (An example of "granted-minor" in the EIS category
involved excluding tax revenues from the plant as a benefit in the
cost-benefit analysis.) This pattern is particularly evident in the substantive is-
sue categories-technical environmental and safety issues.00
The distribution of issue resolutions leaves little doubt that intervenors are
having a negligible effect on plant design through CP case participation. This
statement, however, needs considerable qualification. First, "plant design"
means design of a particular plant being considered in the immediate
licensing case. The Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee, by initially
intervening in the Calvert Cliffs licensing case, had a major impact on both
licensing and design of subsequently licensed nuclear power plants. The nu-
merous ECCS interventions contributed to formulating regulations regarding
ECCS design that have been applied to all commercial nuclear power plants.
Other intervention initiatives have influenced the direction and intensity of
NRC staff reviews. These changes, however, are generic. The observation
raises questions about the impact of intervention in licensing cases, but not
necessarily in the nuclear industry as a whole.
100. "Mixed process" resolution is for cases in which a multitude of procedural issues were ar-
gued over, and the intervenors lost on some, won on others. "Not an issue" refers to the situation
where the licensing board decides the issue is generic. "Resolve in OL" and "Resolve in different
forum" are tantamount to rejection: the licensing board rules that the issue cannot be ruled upon
during the CP hearing. Issues that were reversed in one or more appeals, but ultimately rejected
are said to be "considered and rejected."
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Second, the licensing intervention may have had an indirect impact on
some licensing cases. Although the intervenors "lost" in initial decisions, they
may have influenced the staff reviews in the particular cases because the NRC
staff took care to present particularly good cases if intervenors were present.
Third, raising issues was accompanied by increased discussion during the
hearings. Thus, issues that were eventually ruled "not an issue" were allowed
to be discussed during licensing. This activity may have influenced the ulti-
mate plant designs although the intervenors did not "win." Finally, the pres-
ence of intervenors may have influenced the nuclear industry indirectly
through its impact on diffusion and innovation, as discussed in Section I.
These hypotheses can be tested by looking at the influence of intervention
on licensing time.
IV
ANALYSIS OF LICENSING
Intervenors are expected to have externality effects on uncontested appli-
cations. This point can be demonstrated by a routine case: the Tennessee Val-
ley Authority's (TVA) application for the Hartsville nuclear power plants." '
Private intervenors did not contest the 1974 application. TVA received a con-
struction permit thirty-two months later, in 1977. ' The Comptroller General
investigated the case, concluding that the application was unnecessarily de-
layed about seven months for the following reasons: (The events overlap,
summing to longer than seven months slippage.)
1. The Commission took longer than its own regulations call for to formally
accept the Authority's application. Before the Commission will begin re-
viewing a permit application, it checks the application to make sure it is com-
plete. The Commission's regulations provide that such a determination of
completeness will generally be made within [thirty] days, but for this project
the Commission took [fifty-seven] days. An additional [eighteen] days passed
while (1) the Commission notified the Authority that it would accept the ap-
plication, and (2) the Authority supplied the required number of copies[;]
2. The Commission was late in making an announcement in the Federal Reg-
ister. Once the Commission accepts an application, it then has a notice printed
in the Register to alert interested parties that a public hearing will be held
and that any parties interested in participating in the hearing must apply
within [thirty] days. Getting this notice printed appears to us to be a very sim-
ple matter in that the notice is short and essentially pro forma and can be
prepared during the acceptance review and sent to the Federal Register
printer no later than [one] week after the application is accepted. For the
Hartsville application, it took [thirty-three] days[:]
3. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board was very late in starting the public
hearing. The Commission's regulations state that a hearing should start no
later than [thirty] days after the staff issues its final environmental statement,
101. Docket Nos. 50-518, 50-519. 50-520, 50-521.
102. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 52, at 13.
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unless the parties agree otherwise or the rights of any party would be preju-
diced thereby. The Board, therefore, should be timing its pre-hearing activi-
ties so that it will be ready to start the hearing shortly after the environmental
statement is completed. This was not the case in the Hartsville application.
The Commission staff established about a [six]-month target time that it
would need to publish an environmental statement. But the statement was late
[three] months. Therefore, the Board had a total of [nine] months to get
ready for the hearing. Even so, the hearing did not start for [four] additional
months, which means the Board took over [one] year to set up and begin the
public hearing[;]
4. A [flederal court decision caused the Commission to temporarily stop
issuing permits. The Authority applied for a second limited work
authorization-to enable additional work to be done at the site-on June 10,
1976. While the Commission was reviewing the matter, a [f]ederal [clourt
rendered a decision on the Commission's environmental reviews, which
caused the Commission to suspend its issuance of permits. This suspension
unavoidably delayed the issuance of this permit for about [three] months.' °
According to this account, the project was delayed for about three months
due to court decisions' 0 4 directly ensuing from previous intervention in other
Commission cases. Another partially overlapping six months in licensing slip-
page can be ascribed to ineptitude. Finally, the report states that the staff
and Board took an unusually long time to review or prepare to review the ap-
plication.
This story raises the following questions: Were the NRC's estimates of the
appropriate amount of time to spend in review reasonable? Can the pro-
longed staff review be accredited to the number of applications filed in the
year (suggesting case overload), the number of topics considered, or to staff
preoccupation with other, contested cases?
Our model addresses these questions as follows: After controlling for
various interventions during each year and other plant factors, estimates are
derived for the base licensing time per year. The estimates are "correlated"' 5
with the number of cases in the year (for case overload), the distribution of
intervention and major intervention by year (for the straight externality ef-
fect), and issues raised in cases during the year and previous years (for
topics). At the conclusion of this Section, licensing cases for two years are
analyzed.
103. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1979: Hearings before the Subcomm.
on Nuclear Regulation of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works. 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
114-15 (1978) (letter from the Comptroller General to Congressman Tom Bevill).
104. Aeschliman v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd
sub nom Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978). In response to the lower courts' rulings on fuel reprocessing and waste manage-
ment. the Commission suspended issuance of operating licenses, construction permits and limited
work authorizations on August 13, 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 34, 707 (1976), and resumed licensing
three months later under revised guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 49, 898 (1976).
105. As discussed below, the data are too crude for particularly sophisticated techniques.
"Correlation" is not used here in a statistical sense.
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Licensing time equals the number of months from when the applicant
applies for a CP to the time that the NRC issues the permit. Initially an at-
tempt is made to account for the variance in this variable ("elapsed time")
across plants on the basis of three types of attributes.
First, the year of CP application is important. In particular, the staff
workload, in terms of both the number of cases and the extent of each re-
view, is determined by the date the applicant files for review, rather than the
end of the public hearing. The NRC usually institutes a mild form of grand-
fathering for applications part way through the review process when regula-
tions change. Typically, regulations about review procedures (not design re-
quirements) are specified to apply to applications filed after a certain date,
rather than to permits issued after a certain date.
11 6
The second group of attributes concern what, if any, issues are raised in
licensing. Issues are classified here into one of the six categories described
earlier. By estimating coefficients for different issues and comparing the inci-
dence of issues, two competing theories of intervention can be informally
tested: first, if intervenors just delay all cases; second, if they generally delay
cases because of substantive criticism.
The third group of attributes are certain exogenous plant characteristics:
the vendor, the architect-engineer, and the plant type. Variation due to the
utility is left in the residual. Since most of the sample plants are owned by dif-
ferent utilities, or different consortia of utilities, it is unlikely that the omis-
sion leads to serious bias.'0 7
106. E.g., 10 C.F.R. § 50.34(a)(5) (1978).
107. The model described above is characterized by the following equation:
73 6 n
ELTi, = a + E bsYs + . cj Iss, + 1 djDj + e
s=66 j=1 jI1
where
ELTtt is the exposed time of application i, filed in year t
Y, are dummy variables for the year of CP application:Y I { ifs= t
0 otherwise
Issj are dunmny variables for issues:{ 1 if the hearing considers issues j
= otherwise
the Dj variables are dummy variables for the exogenous attributes.
a, a constant term, denotes the base-case elapsed time (for a plant with CP application filing in
1966, no intervenors and none of the exogenous attributes).
bs, ci, and di are the coefficients associated with the variables Y,, Issj, and Dj, respectively.
ej is the error term.
More complex models, allowing for interaction between issues and between issues and years,
are discussed in L. COHEN, supra note 4. In view of the small sample size, the statistical exposition
here is kept simple. This procedure is adequate to identify general trends in licensing, although
the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients may not carry predictive value.
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The results of the regression analysis are in Table V. None of the exoge-
nous plant attributes consistently influenced the licensing time and they are
excluded.
Coefficients of the year of CP applications reflect the expectation that
licensing time is influenced by workload and review complexity. According to
this model, a 1966 CP application with no intervenors had an anticipated
elapsed time to CP issuance of 15.1 months. The increase from 1967 to 1968
is attributed to the Calvert Cliffs decision. The court decision required retro-
active reviews prior to all subsequent licensing. The review requirement af-
fected most 1968 applications, but not the 1967 applications.
The high values associated with 1970 and 1971 are probably due to a
number of factors. First, applications filed in those years were most subject
to the shifting environmental regulation described earlier. Lower values for
1972 and 1973 reflect in part a successful Commission adjustment to the tim-
ing, content, and requirements of the environmental reviews. Second, the
caseload of the Commission increased dramatically and unexpectedly in the
early 1970s. Not only were a large number of applications filed in 1970 (see
Table I), but the 1971 Calvert Cliffs decision suddenly required environmental
reviews for plants in the midst of the licensing process, as well as for some
previously licensed plants. Most applicants who filed prior to NEPA passage,
TABLE V
COEFFICIENTS OF LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL*
R2= .602
Degrees of Freedom = 78
Constant Term = 15.1
Coefficient Standard Error
Issues
Environ: NEPA, EIS 6.4 3.4
Environ: Tech -2.2 2.9
Safety: Normal .5 3.3
Safety: Emergency 11.2 3.5
Quality Assurance Plans 7.1 3.2
Process -3.7 2.9
Year of CP Application
1967 -1.5 3.9
1968 5.8 4.5
1969 8.1 4.6
1970 13.7 4.4
1971 15.7 5.3
1972 4.9 5.7
1973 9.8 4.2
* See Table III for complete issue headings.
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but lacking CPs by that time, held an expedited environmental review before,
or immediately after, CP issuance to determine if construction should be sus-
pended pending final NEPA review."0 8 The workload-delay hypothesis is sup-
ported by the large coefficient for 1973. As Table III (page 84) shows, 1973
had the highest number of CP applications since 1967).109
It is more difficult to find evidence for the intervenor-externality hypothe-
sis that intervenors affect licensing time of not only the cases in which they
participate, but also in subsequent cases. Neither the percent of contested
cases nor the percent of cases with major intervenors (or simply the number
of such cases) correlate very well to the "base" time for plants in year of Con-
struction Permit Application. This suggests that intervention alone may not
exert a very strong influence on licensing. However, the results support the
hypothesis that intervention influences licensing through raising issues. Plants
licensed after 1968 took longer than earlier plants. The high values for all
plants licensed in the early 1970s reflect, in addition to increased workload,
spillover from the high number of environmental interventions in the late
sixties.
The variation in coefficients of the issues is important. First, the relative
magnitudes of the coefficients do not correspond to the incidence of major
intervenors raising varied issues. If delays are caused in licensing simply by
the presence of intervenors (in the contested case rather than on all cases as
discussed above), then the coefficient for "process" should be high; 94 percent
of the contested cases with major intervenors had process issues. Additionally,
the process issue has been emphasized as causing licensing delays; but neither
this model nor a more complicated version supports that hypothesis1 i 0
Although these estimates do not suggest that delays are due to procedural
jockeying by intervenors, they do indicate that certain issues tend to be
identified consistently with longer cases. Issues relating to the NEPA reviews
have been associated with increased licensing time during this period. This is
in addition to the general environmental-externality effect observed in the
year coefficients. Because the NRC has been subject to almost continual judi-
cial review for its NEPA treatment, licensing boards and staff would review
108. E.g.. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), 4 A.E.C. 912, rev'g in part,
4 A.E.C. 907 (1972).
109. Some of the 1973 plants were held up in the licensing moratorium that affected
Hartsville. This contributes to the size of the coefficient, and also increases the coefficients of the
"issue" variables. Because the moratorium was a (blanket) result of intervention, it should not be
controlled for.
110. See L. Cohen, supra note 4, ch. I. It was thought that the "process" variable might be a
surrogate for multiple issues during a single case. A regression was run that included other vari-
ables intended to pick up any multiple issue effect; in particular, dummy variables for cases with
two issues, or three or more issues. The coefficient for the "process" variable in this regression is
- 1, with a standard error of 3.7.
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cases with NEPA issues-potential court cases-more carefully. However, the
effect tends to be small.
Alternately, from this analysis the environmental-technical issues do not
appear to have a consistent impact on licensing time. A closer examination of
the cases described below reveals that this conclusion results in part from
crudeness of the statistical model. In most of the cases where this issue was
raised, it did not cause an additional delay. In a few pre-1971 cases, the issue
was responsible for major reconsideration and delays during licensing. 111
The relatively small values for environmental coefficients supports the
view that the NRC is primarily a safety-regulatory agency. The Commission
will expend minimum effort on issues unrelated to its central mandate. The
Commission faces serious staffing constraints as the licensing time increases
for years with many applications. Faced with such constraints, an agency is ex-
pected to devote its limited resources to what it perceives to be its most im-
portant goal. The high values of coefficients for Safety-Emergency and Qual-
ity Assurance support this model of an agency (see Table V at 90).
According to this analysis the most important of the issues are related to
accident conditions at plants. The accident-related issues are particularly in-
teresting for two reasons. Unlike either environmental or the normal safety is-
sues, accident issues are raised in longer cases throughout this period. It does
not appear that the NRC has developed successful regulations for reviewing
such issues.
The issue-delay connection is clarified by examining the case histories for
certain years. Consider applications filed in 1972:112 of the four separate 1972
applications, one (Grand Gulf) was uncontested, and had a licensing time of
just under two years.1 13 The other three cases involved numerous intervenors.
The Nine Mile Point Application, discussed above, took two years to re-
solve.' 14 The intervenors raised the "as low as practicable" (normal safety) is-
sues, several process issues (including a request for financial assistance), and
the issue of considering energy conservation as an alternative in the cost-
benefit study and as a variable in the "Need for Power" analysis. During the
public hearing, the main concern of the intervenors was with the latter issue
and they prevailed. Licensing time was not particularly long for the plant.
The second contested 1972 case was Duquesne Light Company's Beaver
11. There is a small negative correlation (about -0.06) between year of application and the
residuals from cases where technical environmental issues were raised.
112. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point, Unit 2), docket no. 50-410; Duquesne
Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2), docket no. 50-412; Duke Power Co. (Ca-
tawba Station Unit 1) docket no 50-413; Mississippi Power & Light Co. (Grand Gulf Station Unit
1), docket no. 50-416.
1 13. Twenty-two months. UNITFD STATES DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 52, at 11.
114. Id. The hearings are recorded in Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point, Unit
2), 7 A.E.C. 1046 (1974) (see also text associated with notes 92, 93 and 94, infra.)
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Valley 2 application." 5 Licensing took 18 months.11 6 The intervenors' main
case at the Beaver Valley hearing concerned low level radiation risks: methods
of calculating the health effects of different low-level doses. In addition,
intervenors claimed that the Licensing Board was unfair, that it attempted to
"judicialize" the proceeding by invoking rules of evidence and thus, disad-
vantaging the intervenors. One group of intervenors brought up "Need for
Power" issues. The issues were not novel and not given much consideration in
the Licensing Board's decision.
The final 1972 case is complicated. The Carolina Environmental Study
Group intervened in the Catawba case, a Duke Power Company plant. The
licensing case took 35 months.'' 7 Intervenors brought up issues relating to
"Need for Power," normal-operation safety, and the emergency core cooling
system (ECCS). They also became involved in an enormous legal wrangle in
which they were not represented by counsel.
The eventual outcome was invalidation of the intervenors' main safety case
on grounds that the issues had been fully aired at a previous hearing.'"" The
Board rejected the ECCS case of the intervenors while both staff and Board
displayed concern over the ECCS. The application straddled two sets of regu-
lations respecting the ECCS. Duke applied for-and eventually received-an
exemption to the new ECCS Final Acceptance Criteria Regulations. Consider-
ing the history of plants licensed during this period, Duke had substantially
more difficulty adjusting to the change in regulations than other utilities.
Examination of these recent cases reveals fairly efficient handling by the
Commission of the environmental issues and substantially more trouble with
the emergency safety issues. The NRC's ease with environmental reviews is
not surprising as it had several years of experience prior to reviewing these
plants. i9
115. Beaver Valley, along with other of the applications considered here, was the focus of a
long antitrust suit, ostensibly conducted by the NRC. The suits are separated from the rest of
licensing and are rarely relevant to the problems considered here. When the Commission rules
on antitrust issues, so that they could conceivably contribute to case work overload, the applica-
tion is credited with a "process" issue. See L. Cohen, supra note 4, ch. 3, for a discussion of the
NRC antitrust cases.
116. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 52. at 11. The hearings are recorded in
Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2), 7 A.E.C. 711 (1974).
117. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF ENERGY. supra note 52, at 12. The hearings are recorded in
Duke Power Co., 7 A.E.C. 659 (1974).
1 18. The discussion centered on the application of collateral estoppel to bar reconsideration
of the safety aspects of the ice condensor and reactor vessel stud bolts, issues raised
unsuccessfully by the same intervenor in Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station.
Units I and 2), 6 A.E.C. 92, 101-04, 106-08, aff'd in part, rem'd in part. 6 A.E.C. 399. 401-04,
406-07 (1973).
119. See Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public
Utility Price Regulation. 17 J. L. & ECON. 291 (1974) for a model of regulation that predicts the en-
vironmental review response observed here.
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The outcomes of licensing cases for plants with 1970 CP applications are
different from the 1972 group; otherwise similar plants took longer to be li-
censed on all counts. Two logical explanations are the newly required envi-
ronmental review and the higher number of applications. Five cases in this
group were uncontested: Forked River, 20 Edwin Hatch,' 2 1 Zimmer 1,122 Arkansas
Nuclear 2123 and Farley 2.124 The licensing time for Forked River is high: 37
months. 25 Other plants were licensed in 29, 30, 27 and 26 months, respec-
tively. The main problem with the Forked River case was assembling a licensing
board, which took 26 months. 126 Another case, Hope Creek,'2 7 was uncon-
tested. However, the reactor site was moved from Newbold Island follow-
ing a contested review in which it was decided that the site was near a
too populated 12 area. During the second review an outside participant-not
a formal intervenor-pointed out that liquid natural gas boats frequently
passed the proposed site. 129 This caused some concern during licensing. The
case took a total of 57 months to resolve (including the site change).
Six applications filed in 1970 were contested. In McGuire (29 months to
completion), 130 Waterford (40) 13 1 and San Onofre (41),132 the major issue was
safety: accident estimates, low population zones, and, in the McGuire case, a
group of technical plant characteristics. Although environmental issues were
raised in all three cases, they were not emphasized. By contrast, Bailly1 3 3 (45
months), Limerick' 34 (51), and La Salle'13  (34) primarily involved environ-
mental contentions. The Bailly intervenors challenged substantial environ-
mental degradation due to plant construction and operation. Although the
120. Jersey Central Power & Light Co. (Forked River Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1),
docket no. 50-363.
121. Georgia Power Co. (Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), docket no. 50-32 1.
122. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station), docket no.
50-358.
123. Arkansas Power & Light Co. (Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2), docket no. 50-368.
124. Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 2), docket no. 50-364.
125. Numbers of months for licensing times in this and succeeding paragraphs are taken
from UNITED STATES DEP'T OF ENERGY, supra note 52, at 3-10.
126. See W. Montgomery & J. Quirk, supra note 11, at 76.
127. Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (Hope Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), docket no.
50-354.
128. Public Serv. Elec. and Gas Co. (Hope Creek Generating Station, Units I and 2), 8 A.E.C.
745. 747 (1974).
129. 9 N.R.C. 14 (1979).
130. Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1), docket no. 50-369.
131. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Generating Station, Unit 3),
docket no. 50-383.
132. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2), docket
no. 50-361.
133. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly generating Station, Nuclear-I), docket no.
50-367.
134. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1), docket no. 50-352.
135. Commonwealth Edison Co. (La Salle County Nuclear Station, Unit 1), docket no. 50-373.
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plant was eventually approved, it went through numerous AEC and judicial
appeals and reached the U.S. Supreme Court. 136 On several occasions, con-
struction was halted.
State regulation was the main holdup in the Limerick case, rather than the
intervenors. Because the plant relied on cooling water from the Delaware
River, the Delaware River Basin Commission had to approve it. Cooling water
availability had not been ensured at the start of the AEC case. Consequently,
neither a Final Environmental Study nor an Environmental Impact Statement
could be completed. The water problem held up the utility's plans for plant
construction timing and design. 13 7
Thus, out of the group of 1970 plants, the plants that took unusually long
to be licensed can be accounted for by substantive issues, uncertainty, and
concern by both the NRC and intervenors over accident problems or technical
environmental problems. The remaining plants with extended licensing
-Limerick and Forked River-were caught in regulatory problems that in
one case, might have been due to an intervenor-externality effect, and in the
other, was independent of the NRC.
V
CONCLUSIONS
An important criterion for evaluating regulatory reform proposals is their
influence on innovation. Light water technology has recently had a dis-
appointingly low (to some) diffusion rate. In addition to electricity demand
conditions, reduced new orders are attributed to the high cost of reactors and
long lead times for them. 138 Because of the NRC licensing role in both of
these causes, reform proposals have been aimed at streamlining and shorten-
ing licensing.
Current reform plans center around several concepts. 3 9 The reforms call
for "site-banking," a procedure that allows utilities to obtain preliminary site
approval prior to licensing. The centerpiece of the reforms is plant standard-
ization.' 40 Plant vendors can obtain approval for a standardized plant or plant
136. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-I). 7 A.E.C. 557. aff'd,
8 A.E.C. 244 (1974), vacated, Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League, Inc. v. Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 515 F.2d 513 (7th Cir.), rev'd and rem'd sub nom. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. '.
Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League, Inc., 423 U.S. 12 (1975), aff'd on rehearing
sub nom. Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 533
F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League, Inc.
v. Nuclear Reg. Comm'n. 429 U.S. 945 (1976).
137. See Philadelphia Elec. Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units I and 2), 1 N.R.C. 163,
167-70 (1975).
138. E.g., Why Atomic Power Dimn Today, supra note 6.
139. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 3, at 31-47 for a description of the re-
forms and a different assessment of their probably impact than described herein.
140. See generally Muntzing, Standardization in Nuclear Power, 15 ATOMIC ENERGY L. J. 21
(1973).
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component design, which is then marketed to numerous utilities. Westing-
house and Bechtel have developed a standard nuclear power plant system
(SNUPPS) that they have offered to utilities since 1973.
Neither standardization nor site-banking (to a lesser extent) address the
major issues associated with delays. As discussed above, major delays concern
the appropriateness of Commission standards, not whether or not a particular
plant satisfies those standards. The standardization plan has not caught on
and SNUPPS plants appear to take as much time as other plants to license un-
der the current process.
Other reforms have been proposals to limit reviews: to dispense with
operating license reviews, remove generic issues from discussion during
licensing, limit the role of public participation, and somewhat curtail the Com-
mission's retrofit power. The Commission retains the right to order retrofits if
significant danger is expected to ensue from not doing so."' The proposals
would delete much of the current system's flexibility, and might inhibit inno-
vation. The rationale is that nuclear plants are relatively standardized and
elaborate review procedures are unnecessary. If public participation serves
only to allow the public its day in court-not because the public can contrib-
ute to safety reviews-then, according to pro-nuclear forces, the role of the
public can be sharply curtailed.
However, the analyses here indicate that this view is incorrect. As dis-
cussed in Sections I1 and IV, the long licensing process for nuclear plants is
not an artifact of bureaucracy and red tape. NRC procedures are based on
the proposition that the technology is changing and that current knowledge
about light water reactors is incomplete. In this context, licensing boards al-
lowed the so-called "generic" issues, most notably those concerned with acci-
dents, into individual licensing case decisions. Although the ultimate rulings
in these cases were that the issues could not be addressed during licensing,
their presence resulted in more discussion, more careful reviews, and longer
licensing time. The Commission's concern is clear: Licensing Boards have the
authority to determine which issues can be discussed and could have elimi-
nated these "generic" issues from the hearings altogether. Licensing Board
decisions during the past twleve years reflect what the Three Mile Island acci-
dent publicly confirmed: the industry is not thoroughly understood. Current
licensing procedures apply to a young and developing technology. If the
process were less flexible, barriers would exist to approval of new concepts. In
addition to the hearings, the examples discussed in Section II aid innovation:
the NRC's current retrofit power and its right to issue CP's for partially
undesigned plants. To make standardization attractive, both of these rights
141. 10C.F.R. § 50.109 (1978).
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must be curtailed. As a result, plans for plants that will not be operating for
at least ten years are stabilized. Paradoxically, if the standardization plan
achieves its goal of licensing control, more units could be ordered and the
rate of diffusion of current technology would increase. Our evidence suggests
that the plan-tenuous at best-is not desirable.
